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Abstract
A network telescope is a portion of IP address space dedicated to observing inbound internet traﬃc. The
purpose of a network telescope is to detect and log malicious traﬃc which originates from internet worms
and viruses. In this paper, we investigate the statistical properties of observed traﬃc from a passive Class
C telescope over a total of three months. We observe that only a few IP sources and destination ports
are responsible for the majority of the traﬃc. We also demonstrate various ways to visualise the traﬃc
proﬁle from a telescope. We show that speciﬁc proﬁles can identify and distinguish portscans, hostscans
and distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attacks. Looking at the inter-arrival time of packets, the power
spectrum and the detrended ﬂuctuation analysis of the observed traﬃc, we show that there is very little
sign of long-range dependence. This is in stark contrast to other network traﬃc and presents exciting
possibilities for identifying malicious traﬃc purely from its traﬃc proﬁle.
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1 Introduction
In recent years there has been a large growth in internet traﬃc generated by mal-
ware, that is, internet worms and viruses. This traﬃc usually only impinges on users
when, either their machine gets infected, or the internet becomes unusable due to
overloaded routers during the epidemic stage of a new worm [1]. However, many
users are unaware that there is also a continuous background level of malware traﬃc
at times of non-epidemic growth, so that devices connecting to the internet today
are subject to a steady stream of portscans, back-scatter from attempted distributed
denial-of-service attacks and hostscans. Recognising and classifying this traﬃc at
an early stage is an important activity if we are to build better ﬁrewalls, protect
the internet router infrastructure, and provide early-warning mechanisms for new
attacks.
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In this paper, we present traﬃc analysis results from an existing network tele-
scope which has been set up to log all inbound traﬃc that is sent to its portion of
internet address space. The telescope we use in this study collects traﬃc sent to a
class C network (256 addresses) that has not been in use for over four years. The
use of larger telescopes has been described in [2,3]; however, in this study we show
that even on such a relatively small telescope classiﬁcation of malware-generated
traﬃc is still practical. The monitoring is entirely passive as there are no machines
actively connected to the network. Other telescopes make use of so called “honey-
pots” to attract traﬃc; for more details see for instance [2,3,4,5]. In these setups,
the telescope interacts with the incoming traﬃc, allowing more information on the
nature of the attacks to be extracted based on the contents of the packets received.
In the case of TCP-based attacks, our telescope sees only the start of a conversation,
or the ﬁrst packets returned in case of spoofed IP addresses.
We use tcpdump to monitor the incoming data. The data is then stored in
a PostgreSQL database to simplify the analysis. Our observations are over two
separate time periods: from 28 January 2005 to 5 March 2005 (period 1) and from
24 March 2005 to 13 May 2005 (period 2).
In Section (2) below, we investigate the total traﬃc and present rank-frequency
plots for the destination port and source IP numbers. We also show the inter-arrival
time distribution of packets and analyse the aggregated packet rate time series for
the long-range dependence that is usually found in network traﬃc [6]. We also show
three-dimensional plots that clearly identify diﬀerent attack types (similar to [7]).
In Section (4), we focus on attacks that are likely to be caused by the Sasser
worm [8]. We try to establish the time between attacks on our class C network.
We also show that this particular traﬃc type has periodicity but no long-range
dependence in its packet trace.
In Section (5), we focus on a particular event in the trace that happens in period
1 between 17 and 19 February 2005. We observe a sudden increase in the packet
rate where the packets appear to be coming from a webserver.
In the last section, Section (6), we present some simple calculations that show
the diﬃculty of interpreting the network telescope data, by trying to calculate the
observed rate for a particular attack from published data.
2 General remarks
In period 1, there were 18,060,643 packets observed, and 20,669,098 in period 2.
This yields a mean arrival rate of between 5 and 6 packets per second. We do not
observe much variation from this mean packet rate over time, as can be seen in
Fig. (2). Tab. (1) shows the distribution of traﬃc type as observed in periods 1
and 2 by the network telescope: the vast majority of the traﬃc is TCP, just 5%
is UDP and 1% is ICMP traﬃc. This distribution hardly diﬀers between the two
periods. Similarly, the destination ports (ports of IP addresses inside the telescope)
show that only a few ports are used for the majority of the traﬃc – see Tab. (2).
As a consequence, ﬁrewalls can be very eﬃcient in keeping out attackers by simply
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Type Frequency in %
S 90.4
UDP 4.8
NBT 2.0
R 1.6
ICMP 1.2
Table 1
Traﬃc type distribution of the traﬃc in period 1 and 2.
Rank Port # per’d 1 cum. frequency Port # per’d 2 cum. frequency
1 135 0.39 135 0.42
2 445 0.65 445 0.64
3 1433 0.71 1433 0.74
4 1025 0.75 139 0.78
5 80 0.79 1025 0.83
6 139 0.83 38293 0.87
7 38293 0.86 80 0.91
8 26943 0.90 137 0.93
9 137 0.92 ICMP 0.95
10 6129 0.93 6129 0.95
11 2745 0.94 2745 0.96
12 ICMP 0.95 1434 0.96
Table 2
Cumulative frequencies of destination ports in period 1 and 2.
denying a few ports rather than a blanket blackout. We also see that the top three
ports responsible for 3/4 of the entire traﬃc do not change at all from period 1 to
2, and for the top twelve accounting for 96% of the traﬃc, there is little change in
the ranking. The source ports show a small preference for port 80, ICMP and some
other ports, which is presumably due to spooﬁng of the telescope addresses, but the
distribution looks much ﬂatter. The large number of port 80 requests are due to
backscatter of a possible denial-of-service attack, as we shall see in Section (5).
To get a better picture indicating how diﬀerently destination ports are dis-
tributed for the two periods we can look at their rank-frequency plot, shown in
Fig. (1). This type of plot is often used to illustrate Zipf’s law for word frequency [9].
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Whilst there is no universal behaviour, there are clearly three separate regions for
Fig. 1. Rank-frequency plot for the destination ports and the IP numbers in period 1 and 2.
the destination ports. The ﬁrst region is formed by the ten most frequently used
ports. After that there are two regions of diﬀerent power laws. For the source port
the distribution is much ﬂatter, which is presumably due to the fact that these are
mainly allocated at random by the operating system running on the source host.
A similar picture presents itself when we look at the rank-frequency plot of the
source IP addresses in Fig. (1). The source IP addresses show three diﬀerent regions
similar to the destination port numbers.
As we mentioned before, the fact that there are heavy tailed distributions at
work can be utilised when one wants to cut down on incoming malware traﬃc: only
a small number of IP addresses and ports are used for the majority of the traﬃc.
However, the downside is that weeding out all worm and virus traﬃc by listing the
IP and port numbers will be hard work as the list is continually growing.
It is also interesting to look at a summary of the total data received by the net-
work telescope during the observation period. To this end, we summarise the data
by presenting the average number of packets seen for each hour of the observation
in Fig. (2). One can clearly see the traﬃc intensity change with a frequency of
about one day. This might relate to the fact that a lot of the traﬃc is caused by
infected PCs which are switched on and oﬀ with that frequency. We can also see an
extraordinary peak around the 22nd day of the observation. The traﬃc intensity
suddenly shoots up by an order of magnitude for a brief time. We shall investigate
this later.
In Kim et al. [7], it was proposed to use a 3D plot using source IP number,
destination IP number and destination port to track attacks. In these plots host
and portscans appear as horizontal lines. Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks tend to
form squares. We can see in Fig. (3) that our data clearly shows various hostscans
having taken place during the monitoring period. In Fig. (3), the source IP address
is represented as an integer by converting A.B.C.D into A× 2563 +B× 2562 +C ×
2561 + D × 2560.
3 Inter-arrival times and long-range dependence
To investigate the statistical nature of the traﬃc seen by the network telescope
we treat the entries of the tcpdump logﬁle as realisation of a point process. Each
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Fig. 2. Summary of the observed network traﬃc.
Fig. 3. 3d plot of 2h of observation data.
packet arrival has an associated timestamp with microsecond accuracy and other
properties such as:
• source and destination IP address
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• source and destination port number
• type: TCP, UDP, ICMP
We also record the actual content of the packet, but since the vast majority of
packets captured are merely TCP SYN or SYN/ACK, and we make no eﬀort to
respond to a TCP SYN to bring up a full connection and begin data transfer, this
provides us with no useful information for TCP data. In our investigation we look at
the entire traﬃc proﬁle, as well as ﬁltering the data by one or more of the properties
above.
We plot the inter-arrival times of packets in a double-logarithmic plot with ex-
ponential bin sizes, similar to measurements of network and printer traﬃc in [10,11].
The overall inter-arrival times show neither signs of being scale-free nor exponen-
tial. They do diﬀer from normal network traﬃc though, as there are more extreme
inter-arrival times and the distinctive peaks around 10 and 120 microseconds are
missing.
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Fig. 4. inter-arrival time distribution.
Ordinary network traﬃc usually exhibits long-range dependence. To this end,
we investigate aggregate packet counts for bins of 0.1 second size. The most direct
way to investigate whether a time series is auto-correlated is to calculate its auto-
correlation function (ACF). However, the ACF is very susceptible to trends and
other non-stationarities in the data. Better estimates for the long-range dependence
are, for instance, power spectrums [12] with ﬁlters, or detrended ﬂuctuation analysis
(DFA) [13,14,15].
Here we use both the power spectrum and the DFA techniques to analyse the
data.
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Given a discrete time series xt, 0 ≤ t ≤ N with mean 〈x〉 the auto correlation
function at lag s can be deﬁned as
C(s) = 〈x¯ix¯i+s〉 =
1
N − s
N−s∑
i=0
x¯ix¯i+s.(1)
where x¯i = xi − 〈x〉. For an uncorrelated time series C(s) is zero, for short range
correlations the ACF will decay exponentially with a characteristic scale s×, C(s) ≈
exp(−s/s×). In contrast, long range correlations follow a power law in their decay:
C(s) ≈ s−γ with 0 < γ < 1. Using the ACF of Eq. (1) directly usually presents
problems as real data will contain trends which, for instance, make the use of the
overall mean of the time series in Eq. (1) problematic (more detail on this can be
found in [16]).
The fact that long-range correlations tend to imply non-stationarity prohibits
the use of the ACF. Other methods, like the power spectrum, also suﬀer from this
problem and are biased estimators. However, the power spectrum can be modiﬁed
to counter this by the use of ﬁlters or windows [12,17].
The detrended ﬂuctuation analysis solves this problem in the following way:
(i) First the proﬁle of the time series is calculated:
Y (i) =
i∑
k=1
xk − 〈x〉(2)
(ii) Next we divide the proﬁle into Ns = N/s non-overlapping pieces of length s;
for simplicity we assume that there is no remainder ([16] explains how more
general situations are treated).
(iii) For each piece 0 ≤ ν ≤ Ns we now ﬁt a polynomial of degree k with values
pkν(i). This allows the computation of the detrended time series proﬁle for each
piece ν:
Ys(i) = Y (i)− p
k
s(i)(3)
The degree k of polynomials pkν(i) can be used to investigate the dependence
of the DFA on trends of order k.
(iv) The next step is to calculate the variance of each piece ν:
F 2s (ν) = 〈Y
2
s (i)〉
1
s
s∑
i=1
Y 2s [(ν − 1)s + i](4)
(v) The ﬁnal step is take the average of all variances at time scale s:
F k(s) =
[
1
2Ns
2Ns∑
ν=1
F 2s (ν)
]1/2
(5)
where k corresponds to the order of the polynomial.
Data that is long-range power law related then exhibits a power law for the
dependence of F (s) on s:
F k(s) ≈ sα(6)
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for large s. As shown in [16] the power law of the ACF and the DFA are related
by:
α = 1− γ/2(7)
Similarly, the power spectrum of the time series can show a power law
S(f) ≈ f−δ(8)
where δ = 0 is white noise and δ = 2 Brownian motion. This is related to the DFA
in [18] by:
δ = 2α− 1(9)
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Fig. 5. Looking for long-range dependence using the DFA (left) and power spectrum method (right).
As we can see from Fig. (5) the changes in graphs of the DFA and power spectrum
actually coincide. The crossovers happen at the same points in the frequency and
time domain. The relation Eq. (9) also holds, though slightly worse for the range
of 10 to 100 seconds. The overall conclusion is that there is very little evidence for
long-range correlation in the data. Normal network traﬃc data shows a gradient of
−1.0 in a frequency range of at least 10−0.5 to 10−3.0 Hz [10]. This is interesting as
there is evidence that any network traﬃc that has shared a bottleneck router with
self-similar traﬃc picks up the signature of that traﬃc [19]. This may be caused by
the fact that we only observe the attempts of TCP connection but not the actual
TCP traﬃc ﬂow. It would be interesting to re-visit older traﬃc measurements and
focus on the TCP SYN/ACK packets in the analysis.
4 The Sasser Worm Attack
In this section, we focus on two IP addresses that contact the telescope on port
445. This a port used by, for instance, the Sasser worm. One hallmark of the worm
is that it tries to contact hosts repeatedly (twice) in a short time period at the
same port. This is thought to be used to determine the operating system of the
targeted host; it then follows up with speciﬁcally crafted exploit packets. Also, the
Sasser worm tends to pick one class C network at a time and scan all hosts on this
network. To estimate the time between attacks we compute the inter-arrival time
for packets for each IP address inside the network telescope separately and neglect
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those smaller than 4 seconds. We plot the histogram of all these inter-arrival times,
so as to estimate the PDF of the inter-arrival times. In Fig. (6), we see the result
for two attackers in both observation periods. The total rate of attacks goes down
from period 1 to 2. On either end of the PDF statistical errors are likely due to
insuﬃcient data. To get an idea of how a single attacker behaves we focus on one
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Fig. 6. inter-arrival time distribution for entire hostscans of the telescope by one particular attacker.
speciﬁc “attacker IP”, and one IP number inside our network telescope. First we
plot the aggregate number of packets sent out by that attacker, Fig. (7). Note that
the attack rate has gone down in the second period from attacks every 3.8 hours
to one in 24 hours. The inter-arrival times are clearly not exponential but are not
heavy tailed either. The power spectrum shows a peak around the 24 hour mark,
which indicates that the attacks arrive periodically. Similarly, the DFA plot hints a
crossover at that point, which can be associated with periodic behaviour [16]. The
values for the DFA and power spectrum match up fairly well according to Eq. (9).
Again, there is no evidence for long-range dependence in the traﬃc trace. The
gradient between 10−4 and 10−5 Hz may be more related to the peak indicating
periodic events.
5 A denial-of-service attack
The telescope observes a signiﬁcant number of denial-of-service attacks. An example
is shown in Fig. (8). We can see how the packet rate rises sharply for a few hours.
In addition, the inter-arrival times change dramatically, with a reasonable power
law over several decades. Similarly the power spectrum and the DFA plot show a
change. However, the change is simply a change from a signal with white noise to
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Fig. 7. Details of the behaviour of one particular attacking IP number. In the top row the packet rate
plot and the inter-arrival time distribution of all packets from this attacker. In the bottom row the power
spectrum and the DFA plot.
Brownian motion, The gradient of the power spectrum changes from δ = −1.8 to
δ = 0, at the same time the DFA changes from α = 1.5 to α = 0.5, in line with
Eq. (9). The crossover occurs in both cases at a timescale of about 500 seconds or
8.4 minutes. Though the packet summary data does actually have a visible trend,
the diﬀerent levels of the DFA show that these trends, at least for trends up to
polynomials of degree 5, do not taint the correlation of the data. If the change from
white noise to Brownian motion is not just caused by the trend in the data but
by the additional attack itself we could use the inter-arrival time histogram, power
spectrum and DFA plot to distinguish peaks caused by a simple rate increase and
those caused by a DoS attack.
6 Sasser Worm: infection rules
In this simple model, we try to recreate the arrival of attacks and their associated
packet traﬃc. To do this, we need to estimate a realistic scan rate for the attackers.
The Sasser worm [8] uses 3 simple rules to choose a class C network for the next
attack. If the infected host has got the IP number A.B.C.D
(i) a random number with probability 1/8
(ii) A.x.y.0 randomly with probability 1/2
(iii) A.B.x.0 randomly with probability 3/8
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Fig. 8. Details of the backscatter from a denial-of-service attack. First the packet rate summary and the
inter-arrival times. In the bottom row the power spectrum and DFA.
Interestingly we observe that the ratio of worm-infected to non-infected machines
in either of those three regions above are of the same order of magnitude. We also
know that the worm is likely to start 128 threads simultaneously for the attacks
analysed in Section (4). So, we could make the following quick calculation:
Assume the attack rate, i.e. the rate class C networks are chosen at, is λA and the
observed (by the Network telescope) attack rate is λO. The number of all possible
class C networks is NC , then the observed rate used by one attacker for a class C
network telescope ought to be:
λA = NCλO(10)
assuming no preference for a particular subset. From our observations this model
would predict rather high attack rates. For one particular attacker IP address we
observe a rate of 5 attacks per day in the ﬁrst and 1 attack per day in the second
period. Given that there are 2543 class C networks, this amounts to λA = 1200
attacks/sec or λA = 300 attacks/sec. According to [8], Sasser variants scan 510
to 40,960 IP addresses per second, meaning anything between 2 to 160 attacks per
second. Notably, the observation in the ﬁrst period is much higher than anything
suggested in [8]. At closer inspection we ﬁnd that the attacker IP address appears
to be part of an address pool that is assigned via DHCP to ADSL subscribers. This
might explain the higher scan frequency, as it corresponds to machine reboots or
ADSL session lengths rather than the actual scan rates. In the second period we
might simply have users that are connected for a longer time. The total number of
observation of attacks in the ﬁrst period is 223 and in the second is 45.
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7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have investigated the nature of traﬃc seen by a passive network
telescope. In our case the address of the network telescope (a class C network)
has been unused for four years. Therefore virtually all of observed inbound traﬃc,
amounting to 6 packets per second, are caused by malware such as worms and
viruses. While hostscans (scans through many IP addresses in the network telescope
for one speciﬁc port) are prevalent, portscans (scans of many ports on one IP address
within the network telescope) are virtually non-existent.
The top 10 destination ports and top 100 IP-addresses account for virtually all
the traﬃc, though both distributions show a very strong power law in the rank-
frequency plot.
The vast majority of the traﬃc is TCP traﬃc, and we see no IPv6 traﬃc at all.
The average packet rate shows no sign of long-term increase or decrease over several
months. The traﬃc also shows surprisingly little sign of long-term correlation as
is usually detected in network traﬃc. This could be caused by the lack of actual
TCP traﬃc ﬂows. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst time that anyone
has speciﬁcally looked for long-range depencence in network traﬃc generated by
malware. We also observe that the ratio of infected machines appears to be constant
over A, B and C class networks.
With the onset of a denial-of-service attack, we saw that the signature of the
traﬃc changed from white noise to Brownian motion, hinting at the possibility of
distinguishing between background traﬃc noise increases and the introduction of
possibly malicious traﬃc streams. With further investigation of this and future
data, we hope to be able to produce realistic artiﬁcial packet workloads to test the
performance of ﬁrewall designs. We will also investigate whether we can use the
data in any way to map parts of the Internet, i.e. deduce its topology. In addition,
we will investigate whether the observed attackers form any interesting network
structures.
With the help of other subnets, we hope to gather data to form a distributed
network telescope. This will be useful to see how attacks are correlated in time and
(address) space.
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